Jeffrey Lewis writes:

One reason that many hawkish Israelis and their Washington fanboys opposed the nuclear deal was precisely because it might work. Resolving the nuclear issue would have removed some sanctions on the regime. This initial wave of attacks isn’t about the nuclear threat; it’s about using the nuclear threat to justify an attempt to topple the regime. Netanyahu essentially admitted this, telling Iranians: “Our fight is with the brutal dictatorship that has oppressed you for 46 years. I believe that the day of your liberation is near.”

Focusing on the political goals for the strike helps explain why Netanyahu took this step now. His speech made the degree to which the nuclear issue is window dressing clear. He claimed that “Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs. Nine.” This is an outright falsehood: The most recent IAEA report confirms that Iran has not enriched uranium above 60 percent U-235. Weapons-grade is 90 percent. Netanyahu also claimed, “In recent months, Iran is taking steps … to weaponize this enriched uranium.” That’s probably also untrue as the Defense Intelligence Agency, as recently as May, stated that “Iran senior leaders probably have not decided to restart its pre-2003 nuclear weapons program, but since April 2025, Iranian officials have threatened to revisit their nuclear doctrine if its nuclear facilities were attacked.”

Netanyahu himself said that Iran might be able to build a nuclear weapon in a year or even months, something he has been saying for decades, even before he dragged out a cartoon bomb at the U.N. General Assembly in 2012.

So why is Netanyahu acting now? First, he has a compliant partner in the Trump administration, which doesn’t seek to be directly involved but also isn’t interested in restraining him. Netanyahu seems to have given Trump his 60 days to reach a deal, but not a day more.

Then there’s the domestic politics. As has been evident throughout the military operation in Gaza, an ongoing security crisis is an essential element of Netanyahu’s strategy for prolonging his hold on political power and delaying his verdict for corruption.

If Israel succeeds in toppling the Islamic regime in Tehran, the strike will have been worth it. But if Israel doesn’t—and honestly, regime change by airstrike alone has a pretty lousy track record, from Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi in 1986 to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 1991 and after or Yugoslavia’s Slobodan Milosevic in 1999—Iran will retain a residual nuclear capability. Israel’s national security advisor has already admitted as much. What then?

The answer from the Israelis, which I don’t believe, is that maybe Iran will then make a deal with Trump to disarm itself. It seems more likely to me that Iran will follow North Korea’s example, withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and finally getting around to building that nuclear weapon. It seems very unlikely that either Russia or China will support additional sanctions on Iran for doing so, given what has transpired, nor will they enforce existing sanctions. Russia, after all, is a major customer for Iran’s military drones, and China buys a lot of Iranian oil.

We don’t fully know why Khamenei halted Iran’s nuclear weapons program in 2003 or why he has stuck with this approach for so long. Clearly, some people in Iran wanted a bomb. Others, though, it seems did not. Until now, the nuclear doves have prevailed. After this strike, though, I imagine those debates are going to look very different. For one thing, there will be a lot of new faces around the table. For another, everyone will take note of what happened to the people who aren’t around anymore, and they’ll ask themselves whether Israel might have been so bold if Iran had nuclear weapons or if Israel did not.

If the regime does not fall, then Israel will have to do all this over again and again. Even if the strike significantly damages Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran can simply reconstitute it. When I asked one Israeli friend about the problem of Iran picking up the pieces and starting over, he compared it to “mowing the grass”—a comparison I didn’t find very compelling at the time. But having watched the carnage in Gaza followed by Netanyahu’s speech telling Israel’s soldiers and citizens to prepare for a protracted conflict, I realize endless carnage may suit Netanyahu and his government just fine.