The New York Times reports:

Trump knew he was wading into dangerous political territory. More than perhaps any other subject, the Israel-Iran issue splits Mr. Trump’s coalition, pitting an anti-interventionist faction, led by media figures like the influential podcast host Tucker Carlson, against anti-Iran conservatives like the radio host Mark Levin.

But inside the administration, despite much hype about disagreements between “Iran hawks” and “doves,” ideological divisions were far less important than they were in Mr. Trump’s first term, when officials like Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson viewed the president as reckless and in need of being restrained from his impulses.

This time, nobody on Mr. Trump’s senior team played anything like that role. The new team generally supported Mr. Trump’s instincts and worked to carry them out. There were differences of opinion, to be sure, but few if any heated showdowns over Iran policy.

Mr. Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth were always deferential to the president’s views, even if Mr. Hegseth, who has a close relationship with Mr. Netanyahu, was more trusting of the Israelis than some of his colleagues.

Mr. Vance warned repeatedly about the prospect of the United States getting entangled in a regime change war, but even those on the team who had historically supported a more muscular stance against Iran backed Mr. Witkoff’s diplomacy. Mr. Trump’s tough-on-Iran national security adviser at the time, Mike Waltz, nonetheless had a close working relationship with the more dovish Mr. Witkoff.

On the intelligence side, Mr. Ratcliffe delivered information without weighing in on one side or the other. And while everyone knew that Ms. Gabbard was as anti-interventionist as they come, she rarely pushed that view on the president.

In April, the Trump team began a series of negotiations in Oman, with the U.S. side of the talks led by Mr. Witkoff, along with Michael Anton, the director of policy planning at the State Department. By the end of May, the Trump team had delivered a written proposal to the Iranians.

It called for Iran to ultimately stop all enrichment of uranium and proposed the creation of a regional consortium to produce nuclear power that would potentially involve Iran, the United States and other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Even as Mr. Trump pursued a diplomatic solution, he seemed persuaded by one thing the Israelis had said to him: having credible military options would give him a stronger hand in negotiations with Iran.

Options for taking out Iran’s nuclear sites already existed inside the Pentagon, but after taking office in January the president authorized U.S. Central Command to coordinate with the Israelis on further refining and developing them.

By the middle of February, in coordination with the Israelis, Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla, the head of Central Command, had developed three main options. The first and most minimal was U.S. refueling and intelligence support for an Israeli mission. The second was Israeli and American joint strikes. The third was a U.S.-led mission with Israel in a supporting role. It would have involved American B-1 and B-2 bombers, carrier aircraft and cruise missiles launched from submarines.

There was also a fourth option, quickly discarded, that included, in addition to large-scale U.S. strikes, an Israeli commando raid with air support from American Osprey helicopters or other aircraft options.

But as Mr. Witkoff pursued negotiations with Tehran, mediated by Oman, the Israelis grew impatient.

Mr. Netanyahu made a quick visit to Mr. Trump at the White House in April. Among other requests, he asked for the American bunker-buster bomb to destroy the underground nuclear site at Fordo.

Mr. Trump, intent at the time on giving diplomacy a chance, was unpersuaded and in the days after the meeting, his team made a full-court press to stop the Israelis from launching pre-emptive strikes against Iran. The message from Mr. Trump’s team was blunt: You cannot just go and do this on your own. There are too many implications for us. These were tense conversations, but Mr. Trump’s advisers thought the Israelis had absorbed their message.

The president was concerned that Israel would strike out on its own or scuttle his diplomacy if Mr. Netanyahu did not like where his deal was heading. The Trump team also worried about what would happen if Israel launched strikes against Iran but failed to destroy all of its nuclear facilities.

But planning in Israel went ahead, driven in part by concern that Iran was rapidly building up its store of ballistic missiles that could be used for retaliatory attacks. Soon, U.S. intelligence agencies had amassed enough information to present it to Mr. Trump. The briefings got the president’s attention, and became the backdrop to the tense phone call in late May, during which Mr. Trump vented his unhappiness at Mr. Netanyahu.

By that point, Mr. Vance was telling associates that he was worried about a potential regime change war, which he considered a dangerous escalation that could spiral out of control. [Continue reading…]