Alison Gocke and Ashley Deeks write:

News headlines regularly announce that China has made a wise choice in pursuing clean energy technologies and weaning itself off oil and gas—a trend that has only accelerated with the U.S.-Iran war. These headlines, which emphasize China’s limited exposure to the greatly diminished supply of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, are true. But the news analysis has missed two key aspects of China’s “electrostate” victory over the “petrostate” status that the United States remains wedded to—and indeed has doubled down on under the Trump administration.

The first story that commentators have missed is that both countries’ energy strategies are about more than just resources—they are about energy markets. Electricity prices are largely set in regional markets that are indirectly connected to the broader world, whereas oil and gas prices are largely set by international markets that are heavily influenced by international developments. As a result, China’s strong focus on using clean energy technologies to electrify its economy means not only that it must buy less oil and gas on a volatile international market but also that its energy pricing is increasingly shielded from global events. As a petrostate, in contrast, the United States has secured energy independence for itself by becoming the number one producer of oil and gas, but its abundance of resources has not enabled it to protect U.S. consumers from international oil and gas markets’ fluctuating prices. In the long run, as electricity becomes the primary form of energy consumed, China’s energy security strategy is enabling it to build an energy system that is both physically and economically insulated from the larger world.

The second overlooked story is about the national security advantages and vulnerabilities that accompany each state’s strategic choice. As the dominant seller of clean energy technology to many other states, China sits on top of critical supply chains for purchasing states. As a result, those states have become dependent on China for a key aspect of their infrastructure, giving China a persistent tool of diplomatic, political, and economic leverage over those states. Further, China has positioned itself to take advantage of technological vulnerabilities in those systems to conduct surveillance and—potentially—engage in future acts of sabotage. In the “weaponized interdependence” framing of Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, China is poised to use its provision of clean energy technology as both a panopticon and a chokepoint against states that use its technology. U.S. sales of oil and gas abroad offer no such security advantages to the United States. [Continue reading…]