Fawaz A. Gerges writes:

Over the past few weeks, U.S. President Donald Trump and his team have voiced contradictory objectives for the war they, together with Israel, launched against Iran. But it is clear that after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, Trump hoped to deal with a transactional authoritarian figure. He called “what we did in Venezuela”—forcing the replacement of one autocrat, President Nicolás Maduro, with another, Delcy Rodríguez—a “perfect scenario” for Iran and insisted on being “involved with the appointment” of Khamenei’s successor, “like Delcy in Venezuela.” A week and a half ago, he again said he wanted to negotiate with the remaining elements of Iran’s clerical regime, although he complained the terms weren’t “good enough yet.”

Trump may have a particularly overt appreciation for authoritarian rulers. But the belief that authoritarianism guarantees stability in the Middle East has long shaped the United States’ foreign policy—and, to a lesser extent, Europe’s. After the chaos that followed the Arab Spring in 2010–11, Western governments worked with autocrats who, they hoped, could keep the region quiescent—wealthy Gulf monarchs who could underwrite their neighbors’ growth or strongmen who could bring a measure of stability to countries such as Egypt. The same logic shaped U.S. and European policy toward Iran during a wave of protests in 2022–23, when Washington limited itself largely to rhetorical support, targeted sanctions, and efforts to keep diplomatic channels open. Advancing security, energy, and geopolitical goals has taken precedence over sustained support for human rights and democratic activism.

But the idea that authoritarian rule undergirds stability in the Middle East is a dangerous myth. By nearly every measurable indicator, the Middle East has been moving in a more autocratic direction since the Arab Spring uprisings. This consolidation of authoritarianism has not led to stability. Instead, the same set of conditions that drove popular protest in Iran before the current war—high youth unemployment, abject poverty, rising inequality, systemic corruption, water shortages, unsustainable debt, accelerating ecological threats, and a lack of hope—are present across much of the region. The wealthy Gulf monarchies were the exception, but these countries with their small populations never represented the region, demographically or socially. Their success, if anything, has obscured the instability of the greater Middle East.

The United States now runs an especially grave risk by building its policy around authoritarians. Such a strategy risks tying the United States more closely to brittle regimes whose survival depends on coercing rather than persuading their people, increasing the likelihood of sudden instability. It also leaves Washington exposed when these regimes face internal crises, forcing a choice between doubling down on unpopular partners or confronting the consequences of their collapse. [Continue reading…]