Claire O. Finkelstein, Brenner M. Fissell, Mitt Regan and Benjamin R. Farley write:

The Supreme Court is poised to decide a potentially momentous question for U.S. democracy: can the president unilaterally deploy federal troops on U.S. soil over the objections of state governors? In Trump v. Illinois, the Supreme Court will soon decide whether to issue a stay of a district court’s injunction of the deployment of National Guard troops to Chicago. The government’s brief argues there is “no reason to believe that courts can, or should, second guess the President’s conclusion” that military force is needed to suppress an emergency. “[T]his case,” the brief argues, falls in the heartland of unreviewable presidential “discretion.” Even if judicial review is permissible, the government says, a court must be “highly deferential” to the President’s decision.

The Government’s position cannot withstand even rudimentary analysis. This is because the president’s authority is dramatically weaker when deploying troops domestically than it is when fighting enemies overseas.

The government’s interpretation suggests that a president may deploy military forces anywhere in the United States for any reason, and that courts would have no authority to determine its legality. This assertion runs counter to U.S. history, the structure of powers related to the military in the U.S. Constitution, and the theory of checks and balances.

The Framers and the generation that fought the American Revolution were well aware of the dangers of domestic use of the military. Among the grievances enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, abuse of the military was persistent theme: “He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our Legislature,” and “He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.” The Third Amendment to the Constitution reflects these concerns in its prohibition on quartering soldiers in civilian homes during times of peace without legislation.

For this and other reasons, the Framers wisely disaggregated the military power horizontally across the three branches of the federal government, as well as vertically between the states and the federal government. They gave Congress the unique power to declare war and appropriate funds for military exploits, along with a series of other war-related powers. They gave the executive branch the authority to command troops in battle. They gave the judiciary the ability to arbitrate disputes among the branches and to protect individual rights. They left to the various states the power to call forth a militia to protect the people within their particular jurisdictions.

In addition to the structural constitutional dissipation of control over the military, statutes like the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act forbid the use of the military for domestic law enforcement. Congress similarly banned the use of troops at polls around the same time. Even the Insurrection Act, which champions of presidential power cite as an ace-up-the-president’s sleeve, says that the president’s power to use the militia or armed forces is, among other purposes, to protect against the deprivation “of a right, privilege, immunity or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law” when the state is unable to protect such rights of the people (emphasis added).

In other words, the power of the president to use the military in times of emergency is arguably tethered to the need to protect the constitutional rights of the people. This is consistent with the president’s articulated duty under Article II of the Constitution to “take care that the laws are faithfully executed.”

The claim of extreme judicial deference to the president rests on a false equivalence of foreign and domestic use of the military. [Continue reading…]