Ori Goldberg writes:

Israel has not claimed responsibility for the rolling “pager attack” in Lebanon. Israeli social discourse, however, is not even debating the issue. It is clear that “we did it” (exclamation point optional). What is it that we actually did? One can surmise that Israeli intelligence established a company that produced pagers and walkie-talkies and managed to pique Hezbollah’s interest in these devices. Hezbollah prides itself on its low-tech approach to communications, assuming that this makes its network impenetrable. The company that produced these devices inserted a small quantity of explosives into each one. Hezbollah made a large purchase and very recently delivered the devices to thousands of its personnel. Soon afterward, someone or something sent a message to all the devices, which reportedly heated them up and caused them to explode. A second wave of explosions shook Lebanon on the following day. Thousands of devices exploded. Thousands were wounded, hundreds critically. More than 30 people are reported to have died, including a 9-year-old girl.

What was the plan? I doubt there was a plan. Israel enjoys complete intelligence superiority over its regional enemies — even if it missed the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. We can assume that Israel also has complete tactical superiority over Hezbollah. Israel has been operating in Lebanon for decades, mostly from the air but also on the ground, via commando operations (not all of which are authorized) and by running a massive network of intelligence operatives. Israeli knowledge is accurate enough to assassinate a senior Hamas leader in his Beirut apartment. It is reasonable to assume that Israel penetrated Hezbollah’s intelligence array and perhaps even its purchasing department. This may seem like an incredible achievement, but the key word here is “tactical.” Israel can mount elaborate, highly impressive operations that end up with extremely specific results. Another example is the theft of the “nuclear archives” from Tehran. Israel identified a storage facility, carried out lengthy and detailed operational planning, and then stole CDs and documents and brought them back to Israel. Does anyone remember a significant effect this operation had on regional or global strategy with regard to the Iranian nuclear program? No. Israel identified a target and had the ability to approach and overtake this target. Israel did it and hoped for the best. This, to the best of my understanding, is the dominant rationale for this operation.

Another potential reason for this attack is Israeli officialdom’s desperate need for another war. [Continue reading…]