Institute for the Study of War reports:

The Kremlin now faces a deeply unstable equilibrium. The Lukashenko-negotiated deal is a short-term fix, not a long-term solution, and Prigozhin’s rebellion exposed severe weaknesses in the Kremlin and Russian MoD. Suggestions that Prigozhin’s rebellion, the Kremlin’s response, and Lukashenko’s mediation were all staged by the Kremlin are absurd. The imagery of Putin appearing on national television to call for the end of an armed rebellion and warning of a repeat of the 1917 revolution – and then requiring mediation from a foreign leader to resolve the rebellion – will have a lasting impact. The rebellion exposed the weakness of the Russian security forces and demonstrated Putin’s inability to use his forces in a timely manner to repel an internal threat and further eroded his monopoly on force. Prigozhin’s rapid drive towards Moscow ridiculed much of the Russian regular forces – and highlighted to any and all security figures, state-owned enterprises, and other key figures in the Russian government that private military forces separate from the central state can achieve impressive results. Wagner’s drive also showcased the degradation of Russia’s military reserves, which are almost entirely committed to fighting in Ukraine, as well as the dangers of reliance on inexperienced conscripts to defend Russia’s borders. The Kremlin struggled to respond quickly in the information space and residents in Rostov-on-Don residents did not oppose Wagner and in some cases greeted them warmly – not inherently demonstrating opposition to Putin but at minimum acceptance of Prigozhin’s actions. Finally, the Kremlin’s apparent surprise at Prigozhin’s move does not reflect well on Russia’s domestic intelligence service, the FSB. Prigozhin consistently escalated his rhetoric against the Russian MoD prior to his armed rebellion and Putin failed to mitigate this risk. We cannot and will not speculate on the concrete impacts of Prigozhin’s rebellion and the Kremlin’s weak response and are not forecasting an imminent collapse of the Russian government, as some have done. Nonetheless, Prigozhin’s rebellion and the resolution of the events of June 23 and 24 – though not necessarily the Prigozhin/Kremlin struggle writ large – will likely substantially damage Putin’s government and the Russian war effort in Ukraine. [Continue reading…]

The Wall Street Journal reports:

The war, initially waged just by the professional military, now affects the entire Russian society. Russia has had to resort to the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of men to shore up the crumbling front lines, prompting a mass wave of emigration. Ukrainian drone attacks deep inside Russia have become commonplace, puncturing Putin’s carefully nurtured image of strength.

Despite these setbacks, Putin continued to believe that time was on Russia’s side. Western democracies helping Ukraine would eventually tire, the thinking went, while his regime, secured by increasingly draconian laws that eliminated the liberal opposition at home, would endure and eventually win. The Wagner uprising, however, made it obvious that Russia is far less stable than Putin believed it to be.

“The hopes of a part of the Russian elite, including, apparently, the president himself, that a long war is beneficial for Russia…are a dangerous illusion,” said Ruslan Pukhov, director of Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a military-affairs think tank. “Prolongation of the war carries huge domestic political risks for the Russian Federation.” [Continue reading…]