Eugene Chausovsky writes:

In its decision-making process on whether to intervene militarily in the former Soviet sphere, Russia’s calculus uses a strategic framework that rests primarily on five variables: 1) a trigger; 2) local support; 3) anticipated military reaction; 4) technical feasibility; and 5) relatively low anticipated political and economic costs, especially when it comes to nonmilitary responses to invasion such as sanctions or diplomatic restrictions.

If any one of these conditions is insufficient or nonexistent, then Russia is unlikely to intervene militarily, even within the former Soviet space. If all these factors are present, there is a much higher likelihood for a Russian military intervention. And if Russia gambles wrong, it pays a very high cost.

Take Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008—each of the five variables was met. The trigger came in the form of Georgian shelling of South Ossetian villages. The local support for Russian intervention was strong but only in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with Russia not sending its ground forces into Georgia proper, where local support was much weaker. Russia had direct access to Georgia via the Rokhi tunnel, and Georgia’s military forces were much weaker than those of Russia, making the intervention technically feasible. Georgia was not yet a NATO member state, and Moscow calculated that the West’s response would be relatively limited and the costs were thus manageable. Russia’s objective was to undermine Georgia’s pursuit of NATO accession, and the result was the 2008 Russia-Georgia War.

In the case of Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, the five variables were met once again. The trigger was the Euromaidan Revolution, which ousted Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych. Local support for Russia’s intervention was strongest in Crimea and the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, but it was very limited in the rest of the country. Logistically, Russia already had troops in Crimea and had direct access to Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but going farther into Ukraine would have entailed long supply lines and more actively hostile political territory. Like Georgia, Ukraine was not yet in NATO, and Moscow calculated that the bloc would not intervene in the event of military action. Russia’s objective was to undermine the pro-Western government of Ukraine and prevent NATO accession, and the result was the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine that continues to this day. [Continue reading…]