Ammar Abdulhamid writes:

The question of alcohol regulation in Syria, recently raised by secular advocates, is far from a minor detail. It strikes at the core of the discussions about the future nature of the Syrian state. The statement by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), during a recent BBC interview that the country is dealing with more serious challenges at this stage was undermined by his own admission that legal experts drafting Syria’s future constitution were looking into this very issue as well. Framing alcohol regulation as a constitutional matter places it within the broader debate over Islam’s role in governance — a matter of profound significance.

There might be more immediate and urgent concerns at this stage, such as economic relief and finding alternative oil supplies as winter sets in. But that does not decrease the importance of a debate about the nature of the state we want to see emerge in the country. And no, it does not matter if the questions about this are sometimes posed by Western journalists.

A likely proposal in the upcoming constitutional discussions will be to declare Islam as the official state religion, as is customary in most Arab-majority countries, with Lebanon’s and Syria’s constitutions being exceptions. However, Syria’s most recent constitution — last modified in 2012, until it was annulled by HTS earlier this month — already identified Islamic jurisprudence as a major source of legislation. Will this now evolve to grant the state authority to ban alcohol production, consumption and importation, impose sex segregation in public spaces and Islamic dress code on women, and legislate other moral issues? Or will the new constitution retain its vague phrasing, delegating interpretation to legislators and the judiciary, thus leaving the door open for concerns over potential bans and restrictions that could happen at any moment in the future?

Secularists argue for the removal of such clauses altogether, so as to avoid any grey areas in the constitution that could be usurped by ideologues. In other words, the state should belong to all Syrians — individuals and communities — with no potential backdoor for it to be controlled by a small ideological elite. [Continue reading…]